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THE PROGRESSION AND EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP
OVER THE PAST 50 YEARS:
SOME QUANTITATIVE OBSERVATIONS
Donald J. Kochan*
INTRODUCTION
International law as a field of scholarship has experienced some very
substantial and interesting changes across the past fifty years. This brief
Article provides some basic quantitative observations from which we can
begin to visualize this evolution.
It is my hope that this numerical data can serve as a starting point for
further research and more qualitative analyses on those changes. When one
considers, for example, that in 1965 only thirty-eighty articles in law re-
views or law journals mentioned the term "international law" in one way or
another, while in 2013 (the latest full year of data) more than 4000 articles
published in law reviews and law journals used that term, there can be no
doubt that legal scholarship's interaction with international law has dramati-
cally changed in frequency across the past fifty years. With a more than
10,600 percent increase in the volume of articles mentioning that term in
the past five decades, it is hard not to speculate that there have also been
significant changes in the types of articles being produced in the field.
I. THE SPECIAL STATUS ACCORDED INTERNATIONAL LAW
SCHOLARSHIP IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Debates have intensified in recent years about the utility of legal schol-
arship generally,' and international law scholarship has not been immune
from some specific scrutiny.2 Yet few fields of legal scholarship have a
* Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Professor of Law,
Chapman University's Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
I. See, e.g., Brent Newton, Scholar's Highlight: Law Review Articles in the Eyes
of the Justices, SCOTUSBLoG, (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/
scholar%E2%80%99s-highlight-law-review-articles-in-the-eyes-of-the-justices/ (exam-
ining, inter alia, Chief Justice Roberts' recent critique of legal scholarship as often
being "not much help to the bar").
2. Consider, for example, the comments of Professor Jack Goldsmith that "[tihe
legal academy views international law scholarship, on average, as less successful than
other legal scholarship by just about any measure, including clarity, insight, theoretical
sophistication, persuasiveness, and depth." Panel, Scholars in the Construction and Cri-
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history like international law scholarship, where the courts and other au-
thorities have identified scholars of international law as holding a special
place in the interpretation of law.
3
Over time, using the words "scholar", "jurist", "commentator", "ex-
pert", and "publicist" somewhat interchangeably, the courts and interna-
tional law systems have come to regard international law "scholarship" as
an important reference source for interpreting what constitutes international
law. For example, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance
with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply...
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law."
4
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged a special
place for scholars in the interpretation of international law in U.S. courts.
The leading cases in this regard include United States v. Smith5 and The
Paquete Habana,6 together with The Nereide7 established the now suppos-
edly "unexceptionable" proposition" that the "law of nations" is included in
the federal common law of the United States9 and began to explain the
methods for interpreting the contours of this area of law and the role for
scholars in that enterprise.
Smith involved a prosecution for piracy concerning the "plunder and
robbery" of a Spanish vessel.10 Thomas Smith, having participated in the
piracy of the Spanish vessel, was prosecuted under an 1819 Act of Congress
which stated, "if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations... every such
tique of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317, 319 (2000) (remarks of
panelist Jack Goldsmith) [hereinafter "Goldsmith"].
3. James Boeving, Half Full.. . Or Completely Empty?: Environmental Alien Tort
Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. Rev. 109, 140-142
(2005) (the special recognition that courts give to international law scholarship "places
international legal scholars in a position not typically enjoyed by other academics.").
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis added); See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102-103 (1987) (discussing role of international law
scholars in ascertaining international law).
5. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153 (1820).
6. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
7. The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815).
8. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring).
9. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 423.
10. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 153-155.
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offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof. . . be punished with
death." I" The jury returned a special verdict finding Smith was involved in
the plunder and robbery, and if these actions constituted "piracy" under the
1819 Act, a question of law, he would be in violation of the Act.' 2 Address-
ing the legal question, Justice Joseph Story, writing for the Supreme Court,
found that Smith's acts constituted piracy "as defined by the law of
nations."' 13
Finding that Congress could allow the judiciary to determine the
meaning of statutory terms by reference to the "law of nations," Story set
forth the now oft-quoted method for ascertaining the "law of nations."
Courts may ascertain the law of nations "by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law."'14
From examining a variety of sources in each category, Story concluded that
Smith's actions fell within those universally treated as piracy in violation of
the law of nations.' 5
A similar approach to ascertaining the law of nations was adopted in
The Paquete Habana.'6 The Paquete Habana, a fishing vessel sailing under
the Spanish flag, was captured off the coast of Cuba by a U.S. gunboat.' 7
The vessel and her cargo were condemned as prizes of war and later sold at
auction.' 8 The owner and the master, on behalf of the other crew members
who were entitled to shares of the Habana's catch, brought a suit challeng-
ing the seizure as unlawful. 19 The Supreme Court, in order to determine
whether fishing vessels were legally subject to capture during the war with
Spain, looked to the law of nations and found that "coast fishing vessels...
have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture
as prize of war."20
After tracing a significant amount of history on the international treat-
ment of fishing vessels as prizes of war, the Court set forth perhaps the
most relied upon statement relating to scope of the justiciability of the "law
of nations," explaining that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
11. Id. at 154 n. a.
12. Id. at 154-55.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Id. at 160-61 (emphasis added).
15. See id. at 161-63.
16. See generally, Paquete Habana,175 U.S. at 700.
17. See id. at 678-79.
18. See id. at 679.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 686.
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diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
for their determination." 21
The Paquete Habana Court continued to explain that scholars can be
consulted as part of the court's task in determining the existence and mean-
ing of international law. The Court explained that:
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience,
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat.22
Of course, the Court cautioned that it was not asking for the views of
scholars to shape the law but instead to report it. In other words, "[s]uch
[scholarly] works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the specula-
tions of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustwor-
thy evidence of what the law really is."'23 In support of its optimistic view
that jurists (i.e., scholars) can accomplish the neutral task of reporting inter-
national law rather than trying to create it, the Court cites Wheaton's assur-
ance that jurists and commentators are "generally impartial in their
judgment. '24 It is this trust and belief in international law scholars that orig-
21. Id. at 700.
22. Id. at 700-01 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 700 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895)). A
similar approach to defining international law is adopted by the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, supra note 4, arts. 38 & 59, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 1062. See also
Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 265 (2d Cir. 2003) ("judicial
tribunals may only 'resort[ ] to' the works of 'jurists and commentators' insofar as such
works set forth the current law as it 'really is.' . . . [C]ourts may not entertain as evi-
dence of customary international law 'speculations' by 'jurists and commentators'
about 'what the law ought to be."').
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (citing WHEATON'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 15 (8th ed.)). But see C. Donald Johnson, Jr., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contri-
bution to the Development of Customary International Law by a Domestic Court, I I
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 335, 336-37 (1981) (explaining that the difficulty in defining
international law is compounded "by the wide variance among academic specialists in
the field in approaching the sources of international law," and describing the subject
matter of the practice of nations as "often nebulous"); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 319
("As a general matter, international law scholarship is characterized by normative rather
than positive argument, and by idealism and advocacy rather than skepticism and de-
tachment."); Jorg Kammerhofer, Law-making by Scholars, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING, 1, 11 (Catherine
Brolmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182547 ("Many
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inally gave their work special status in the legal interpretation of interna-
tional law by the courts and other authorities.
II. DEBATES OVER THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'S
SPECIAL STATUS IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Over time and especially in more recent decades, serious debates have
ensued over whether international law scholars and scholarship deserve this
kind of special recognition and status. On one side, some claim that schol-
ars have been reliable guides as experts in the field of international law and
"instrumental" in the identification of practices rising to the level of interna-
tional law.25 Others, like Judge Robb of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, have lamented that "[c]ourts ought not to serve as debating
clubs for professors willing to argue over what is or what is not an accepted
violation of the law of nations. '2 6 These critics have been worried that invit-
ing the opinions of scholars into judicial interpretation of international law
would lead to litigation with "citations to various distinguished journals of
international legal studies," yet leaving the court with "little more than a
numbing sense of how varied is the world of public international 'law.' "27
Examples of these competing views of international law scholarship
abound. Some, like Professor Beth Stephens for example, contend that
courts have a "need for expert assistance in deciphering the content of inter-
national rules, which develop through the complex interaction of judicial
scholars working on international human rights and humanitarian law today incorporate
a strain of political activism into their legal scholarship.").
25. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Kedian, Customarv International Law and Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the
Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395, 1401-1402 (1999) ("In accordance
with the words of The Paquete Habana.... experts have been instrumental in determin-
ing the status of various practices; however, their role is not to steer the law in a specific
direction. Rather, they work with existing definitions and examples of practices that
already have become customary international law in making their assessments.").
26. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring). See also Goldsmith, supra
note 2, at 318 (claiming that "[i]nternational law scholars have no special claim to
insight ... lack a democratic pedigree [and] are among the most biased when it comes
to the content of the customary international law of human rights, and thus deserve
little, if any, deference on these issues."); J6rg Kammerhofer, Orthodox Generalists and
Political Activists in International Legal Scholarship, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A
MULTIPOLAR WORLD (Matthew Happold ed. 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551343
("It seems that scholars working on international law are tempted too much by factors
beyond the sum total of the positive law to be able to restrict themselves to it.").
27. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
2015-2016]
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and legislative decisions, diplomacy-and scholarship."28 Stephens stresses
that this need for scholarly insight when interpreting international law is "as
evident as ever" 29 in today's legal landscape. Furthermore, Stephens con-
tends that the diversity in international law scholarship that has evolved and
exists today should not disqualify the field from maintaining its special sta-
tus with courts; she believes that we can trust courts to filter and "distin-
guish between good scholarship and bad, between wishful thinking and
well-founded analysis. °30 Meanwhile, others like Judge Cabranes of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have cautioned that such fil-
tering is especially important and difficult. In Flores v. Southern Peru Cop-
per Corp., Judge Cabranes stressed that international law is uniquely
difficult for judges, explaining "[t]he acknowledgment in Paquete Habana
and Article 38 of the works of scholars as subsidiary or secondary sources
of customary international law stems from the fact that, as noted above, the
primary evidence of customary international law is widely dispersed and
generally unfamiliar to lawyers and judges." 31 But Judge Cabranes
cautioned:
neither Paquete Habana nor Article 38 recognizes as a source of cus-
tomary international law the policy-driven or theoretical work of ad-
vocates that comprises a substantial amount of contemporary
international law scholarship. Nor do these authorities permit us to
consider personal viewpoints expressed in the affidavits of interna-
tional law scholars.32
He concluded that, "[i]n sum, although scholars may provide accurate
descriptions of the actual customs and practices and legal obligations of
States, only the courts may determine whether these customs and practices
give rise to a rule of customary international law."'33 The rise of this type of
cautionary concern about the need for evaluating the substance and pur-
poses behind particular works of international law scholars has coincided
with the general increase in the number of international law "scholars" in
28. Beth Stephens, Panelist, Rutgers-Camden School of Law, Scholars in the Con-
struction and Critique of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317, 317-18
(Apr. 8, 2000).
29. Id. at 318.
30. Id.
31. Flores, 414 F.3d at 265 (2d Cir. 2003).
32. Id.
33. Id.; See also U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93-103 (2d Cir. 2003) (stressing that
"[i]n a system governed by the rule of law, no private person-or group of men and
women such as comprise the body of international law scholars-creates the law. . ..
we look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official actions of States and only sec-
ondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the established practice of States.").
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the field, the number of works of scholarship being produced, and the
greater diversity of motivations underlying scholarship, including moving
beyond simply reporting what the law is.
There is certainly an increased debate over whether yesterday's schol-
arship which received special status is sufficiently similar to the field of
international law scholarship today. As stated above, Professor Stephens
has made a case that the field has indeed changed but in ways that only
enhance its utility generally including to the courts.34 Furthermore, some
like Professor Bruno Simma claim that scholars are still often relied on in
the operations of international law and "[s]cholars of international law typi-
cally have an unjustified modesty about their own influence."'35 Nonethe-
less, others like Professor Jack Goldsmith contend that using the writings of
scholars as a source of international law "made sense during the nineteenth
century positivist heyday of international law, when scholars did the hard
work of collecting international practices. But it makes little sense today." 36
This Article does not aim to resolve these disputes. My scope here is
more limited. But, the existence of this debate over the relative importance
of international law scholarship to the actual interpretation and application
of international law makes the quantitative observations in this Article's
final section relevant and consequential to any comprehensive discussion of
those substantive issues.
34. Stephens, supra note 28, at 318.
35. Bruno Simma, Panelist, Rutgers-Camden School of Law Scholars in the Con-
struction and Critique of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317, 319
(2000); see also id. (remarks of Harold G. Maier) (reflecting acceptingly on "a wide
role for the scholar in the identification, if not the formation, of international legal
norms.").
36. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 318. See also VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PAN-
SIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 9:2 (2d ed. 2012)
("Whereas in the past, scholars may have been instrumental in gathering and analyzing
international practices, in today's information age, scholars are more apt to be engaged
in advocacy or otherwise making normative judgments."); Boeving, supra note 3, at
142 ("In the late nineteenth century scholars were relied upon because they were
viewed as fair and impartial, without a political or scholarly agenda," but "the concern
today is that international legal scholars are all too often more like biased advocates,
seeking to expand international law to fit a particular agenda, rather than impartial
guides."); J6rg Kammerhofer, Law-making by scholarship? The dark side of 21st cen-
tury international legal 'methodology', in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-26 (James Crawford et al. ed. 2012), http:l/
ssrn.com/abstract=1631510 ("we must return to, or, rather, explore a concept of legal
scholarship that focuses on the analysis of the law in force, rather than the law we wish
to see.").
2015-20161
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW'S EVOLVING STATUS AND
QUANTITATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
SCHOLARSHIP OVER TIME
Whichever side one takes in the debate over the appropriate role for
scholarship in the identification of international law - or even if one falls
into some middle ground - it is certain that history has given at least some
forms of international law scholarship special status. That fact alone war-
rants particular attention to this scholarly field and necessarily affects the
assessment of the field's influence. It also seems beyond doubt that this
field of scholarship has changed over time - particularly after observing the
quantitative data in the remainder of this Article. The totality of interna-
tional law scholarship as it existed in the 18th, 19th, and early-20th centu-
ries is far different from its 1965 iteration, which was still quite different
from the totality of international law scholarship produced today in 2015.
If international law is an evolving concept, then so too must interna-
tional law scholarship be an evolving one. The phrase "law of nations,"
after all, was the original term for expressing early international law, a con-
cept understood to be much more limited than what we consider "interna-
tional law" today. In most contemporary literature, however, the "law of
nations" is considered coterminous with "international law." Furthermore,
in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in 1980 solidified the notion that "international law," used
by the court as synonymous with the "law of nations," is an evolving con-
cept to be ascertained by the courts. The Second Circuit held that courts
ascertaining the law of nations "must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today." And while the term "law of nations" has given way to "international
law," so too has the concept of "human rights" come to dominate much of
the contemporary debate over what constitutes international law.
It is for these reasons that the data compiled here focuses principally
on those three terms - "the law of nations," "international law," and
"human rights." To appreciate the evolution of concepts in international law
generally, the graphs in Figures 1 through 13 will look at three separate
types of data. First, term usage in books will be examined. Second, term
usage in cases will be compiled and graphed. Then, we will turn to the
usage of these terms in law reviews and law journals specifically to get a
glimpse of the quantitative rise in attention given to international law in
legal scholarship across the past fifty years.
We begin with some observations then on the usage of these terms in
books - which may be a relatively accurate proxy for cultural usage gener-
ally. Some informative results are generated by Google's N-gram function.
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This Google function has been described as "the first tool of its kind, capa-
ble of precisely and rapidly quantifying cultural trends based on massive
quantities of data." This tool enables users "to examine the frequency of
words. . . or phrases.. . in books over time." The database accesses "over
5.2 million books: -4% of all books ever published" when conducting a
search and producing an N-gram. Even if this tool is a bit raw and elemen-
tary, through it one can get a sense of some patterns in the relative fre-
quency of usage for particular words and phrases.
Figure 1 presents the N-gram results for the terms "law of nations,"
"international law," and "human rights" from 1800 to 2008 (the last availa-
ble date in the program). I began with this date range because it tellingly
shows the dominance of the term "law of nations" early on, only to be
overtaken by the term "international law" in the later part of the 19th cen-
tury; it shows the gradual, continuous decline in usage for the "law of na-
tions" through today. Figure 1 also shows the spiking in frequency for
"international law" in the 1920s as one might expect given history and the
geopolitical climate of that time, and it shows the increased usage of the
term "human rights" around World War II and the dramatic ascendance in
frequency of "human rights" as a term of discussion in books in the late-
1980s and beyond.
FIGURE 1: GOOGLE LABS BOOKS N-GRAM VIEWER GRAPH
"INTERNATIONAL LAW", "LAW OF NATIONS," AND "HUMAN
RIGHTS" FROM 1800 TO 2008 FROM THE CORPUS OF
ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3
0.00220%-
0.00200%. human rights
0.00180%-
0.00160% - ...... . ..
0.00140%-
0.00120% " ..........-............... law f na.ions
0.00100% 0 .. . .. ..0 . ............
0.00080% - ... ... ......
0.00060% .... ........... .... ...... ... ... international law
0.00040%-
0.000% law of nations
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 200
Figure 1. Source: Goont ti BOOKS N-GRAM Viv'WFiR, http.//books.google.com/ngrams (last visited De-
cember 31, 2014) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel*, Yuan Kui
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books
Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancv, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin
A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden*. Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized
Books. Sc Nwct:., Jan. 14, 2011, at 176).
Each of these terms have only appeared in a relatively small percent-
age of the overall books in Google's digitized collection, but Figure 1 at
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least shows interesting trends in usage and helps provide some context for
the international law "story" over time. Each line in this N-gram represents
what is called a "unigram" for each term. The y-axis shows what percent-
age of all the unigrams contained in Google's sample of books written in
English include the phrase or term tested. "Usage frequency is computed by
dividing the number of instances of the N-gram in a given year by the total
number of words in the corpus in that year. '37 Smoothing is adjustable and
simply permits a consideration of the trends as a moving average. 38
Figure 2 simply condenses the years graphed so that one can get a
closer look at the past fifty years of term frequency (in books at least).
Figure 2 looks at the terms across the years 1965-2008 (again, the last avail-
able year in the program):
For the reminder of the data presented in this Article, including
Figures 3 through 13, searches were done in WestlawNext to identify the
frequency of the terms in two databases: (1) Federal and State Court Opin-
ions combined; and (2) Journals and Law Reviews. The compilation falls
short of providing a full fifty years' worth of data. Given that there is often
a lag time between publication date and date of actual printing in the pro-
duction process of many law reviews and law journals - so that an article
with a 2014 date might actually be printed in mid-2015 - I made the deci-
sion to collect data only through 2013 (the last year that presumably has
been almost completely populated in the Journals and Law Review
database).
37. See Michel et al., supra note 42, at 176. The Google Ngram data is "normal-
ize[d] by the number of books published in each year." What's All This Do?, GOOGLE
BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams/info (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
38. Google Books describes "smoothing" as follows:
Often trends become more apparent when data is viewed as a moving average. A
smoothing of I means that the data shown for 1950 will be an average of the raw
count for 1950 plus I value on either side: ("count for 1949" + "count for 1950" +
"count for 1951"), divided by 3. So a smoothing of 10 means that 21 values will be
averaged: 10 on either side, plus the target value in the center of them. At the left
and right edges of the graph, fewer values are averaged. With a smoothing of 3, the
leftmost value (pretend it's the year 1950) will be calculated as ("count for 1950"
+ "count for 1951" + "count for 1952" + "count for 1953"), divided by 4.
What's All This Do?, supra note 47. In addition to providing the graphed results,
searches for terms and phrases also produce hyperlinks appearing below the graph, al-
lowing one to browse through the books available that contributed to the data set. Id.
("Below the graph, we show 'interesting' year ranges for your query terms. Clicking on
those will submit your query directly to Google Books.").
[Vol. 22
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FIGURE 2: GOOGLE LABS BOOKS N-GRAM VIEWER GRAPH
"INTERNATIONAL LAW", "LAW OF NATIONS," AND "HUMAN
RIGHTS" FROM 1965 TO 2008 FROM THE CORPUS OF
ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3
0.00220%-
, human rights
0.00080% - ..........
0.00160%-
0.00140% =
0.00120%"
0.00100% .. ... .....
0.00080%
0.00060%- international law~
0.00020%-
0.00000%- law of nations
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Figure 2. Source: Gxxi,.r BOX)Ks N-GRAM VU,,wr, http://books.google.cotn/iigramns (last visited De-
cember 31, 2014) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel*, Yuan Kui
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books
Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin
A. Nowak, and Erez Liebernan Aide, * Quantitative Anal~yfis of Culture Usitig Millions of Digitized
Books. SCu.WNcr. Jan,. 14, 2011, (it 176).
FIGURE 3: FEDERAL AND STATES CASE OPINIONS USING TERMS
"HUMAN RIGHTS" (TOP LINE), "INTERNATIONAL LAW" (MIDDLE
LINE) AND "LAW OF NATIONS" (BOTTOM LINE)
3000
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-Federal and State Cases Using Term "International Law"
.......Federal and State Cases Using Term "Law of Nations"
Figure 3. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search a WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
The frequency of these three terms - "law of nations," "international
law," and "human rights" - in state and federal court opinions shows simi-
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larly interesting trends. As depicted in Figure 3 and listed in the Appendix,
between 1965 and 2013, 1,297 case opinions used the term "law of na-
tions," 8,025 case opinions used the term "international law," and 47,178
case opinions used the terms "human rights" and/or "human right." The
Appendix breaks these numbers down by year.
Figures 4 through 6 provide a separate visual analysis for each term on
its own so that one can better appreciate the frequency and to more starkly
illustrate the progression associated with each term's usage in federal and
state case opinions.
FIGURE 4: FEDERAL AND STATE CASE OPINIONS USING TERM "LAW
OF NATIONS", 1965-2013
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Figure 4. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
FIGURE 5: FEDERAL & STATE CASE OPINIONS USING TERM
"INTERNATIONAL LAW", 1965-2013
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Figure 5. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
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FIGURE 6: FEDERAL AND STATE CASE OPINIONS USING TERM
"HUMAN RIGHT" OR "HUMAN RIGHTS", 1965-2013
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Figure 6. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan rfirol search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
Figures 7 through 10 turn from usage in case opinions to usage of each
term in scholarly articles. The usage of these terms in legal scholarship
shows some of the same general patterns already seen in case opinions. This
next set of graphs is designed to examine trends in the overall number of
scholarly works that interact with the terms "law of nations," "international
law," and "human rights" by examining the number of articles using each
term in the WestlawNext Journals and Law Review database for each year
between 1965 and 2013.
There are, admittedly, several limitations in this methodology. For ex-
ample, the following compilations do not account for volume of usage
within an article or otherwise attempt to evaluate the quality of the usage of
the term in any article. Second, the compilation has no controls for database
coverage or scope limitations regarding what journals are included in
Westlaw. I am accepting this as a limit but also working with an informed
assumption that this database in Westlaw is fairly comprehensive of the
available journals in existence across most of these years. A third type of
limitation arises in the lack of several control variables, including the total
number of scholarly articles published in all fields over time. There have
undoubtedly been dramatic increases in the total number of articles of any
kind published in law reviews and law journals across the past fifty years if
for no other reason than there are a lot more law reviews and law journals.
Thus, the increase in international law articles may not be unique. Yet, the
fact that there are so many more articles discussing international law still is
telling regarding its own increased attention, and the expansion has conse-
quences for its influence.
As another example of a methodological disclaimer, the limited in-
quiry into scholarship that appears in law journals or law reviews obviously
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omits a substantial amount of international law scholarship that exists in
books, treatises, and other secondary materials. Were it to be useful, we
could spend a great deal of time coming up with even more reasons why the
following compilations have somewhat limited utility and methodological
constraints. Suffice it to say, this is neither a perfect nor a comprehensive
picture of all international legal scholarship. But, I do believe that it is
nonetheless an informative and reliable glimpse at the overall volume of
scholarship in the international law field and that the data actually compiled
can be a sufficient proxy for associated scholarship trends.
FIGURE 7: LAW REVIEW AND LAW JOURNAL ARTICLES USING
TERMS "INTERNATIONAL LAW" (INITIAL UPPER LINE), "HUMAN
RIGHTS" (ENDING UPPER LINE) AND "LAW OF NATIONS" (LOWER
LINE), 1965-2013
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Figure 7. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
As depicted in Figure 7 and listed in the Appendix, between 1965 and
2013, 9,400 law review and law journal articles used the term "law of na-
tions," 78,641 law review and law journal articles used the term "interna-
tional law," and 74,470 law review and law journal articles used the terms
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"human rights" and/or "human right". The Appendix breaks these numbers
down by year.
FIGURE 8: LAW REVIEW AND LAW JOURNAL ARTICLES USING THE
TERM "INTERNATIONAL LAW", 1965-2013
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Figure 8. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan frmn search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
Figures 8 through 10 provide a separate visual analysis for each term
on its own so that one can better appreciate the frequency, and to more
starkly illustrate the progression associated with each term's usage in law
review and law journal articles.
FIGURE 9: LAW REVIEWS AND LAW JOURNAL ARTICLES USING
TERMS "LAW OF NATIONS", 1965-2013
600
500
400
300
: 200
100
0
tin t-- ON M kn C- ON M kn r- ONl MW r C-- ON M r) in - ON
'.C 110 '0 C-- C-- - C- - 00 0000000 ON ONONON 0 (0 C0 0C0ON, ON, ON ON, ON ON- ON ON- ON- ON, ON, ON, ON, ON, ON- ON- ON- O 0000000
YEAR
Figure 9. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search qf WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
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Figure 10. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
Finally, Figures 11 through 13 show the frequency of each term's us-
age in both articles and cases in one graph. These are useful visuals prima-
rily because they show a much more substantial increase in scholarships'
usage of the terms than seen in judicial opinions' usage of the terms (at
least for the terms "law of nations" and "international law", and to a lesser
extent "human rights").
FIGURE 11: ARTICLES (UPPER LINE) AND CASES (LOWER LINE)
USING TERM "INTERNATIONAL LAW", 1965-2013
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Figure 11. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search oj WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
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FIGURE 12: ARTICLES (UPPER LINE) AND CASES (LOWER LINE)
USING THE TERM "LAW OF NATIONS", 1965-2013
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Figure 12. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNext, Dec. 28, 2014.
FIGURE 13: ARTICLES (ENDING UPPER LINE) AND CASES (ENDING
LOWER LINE) USING TERM "HUMAN RIGHTS", 1965-2013
5000
Cd)
w 4000
U 3000
0 2000
S1000
U 0-- - - -
YEAR
---- Law Review and Law Journal Articles Using Terms "Human Right" or
"Human Rights"
-Federal and State Cases Using Terms "Human Right" or "Human Rights"
Figure 13. Data Compiled by Donald J. Kochan from search of WestlawNexi, Dec. 28, 2014.
CONCLUSION
The data presented in this essay clearly shows a dramatic quantitative
expansion of the amount of international law scholarship over the past f
years. It is my hope that the data provided herein can serve useful to those
wishing to further dissect the quantitative data and also to those that will
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attempt to catalogue the qualitative changes in international law scholarship
across time.
With quantitative differences across the years in international law
scholarship, there have undoubtedly been qualitative differences as well in
the scholarly products published. The fact that international law scholarship
has evolved and expanded does not immediately lead to a conclusion that
something has changed for the worse in the field. In fact, most fields of
legal scholarship have a diversity of scholarship that spans reporting what
the law is, analyzing how well the law operates, examining how the law can
be improved, and advocating for what the law should be. The nature of
international law scholarship has evolved to embrace each of these types of
scholarship and along the way has even made room for those that do not
take the importance or superiority of international law or international legal
regimes for granted as well as room for those that challenge the idea that
international law should or can legitimately expand its sphere of controlling
influence together with those who believe in a robust system of interna-
tional law.
However, because much of modern international law scholarship does
not simply report what has emerged as international law according to ac-
cepted standards, it likely can no longer be said (assuming it ever could be)
that all of international law scholarship as it exists today is worthy of some
special status or recognition by judges or others attempting to identify inter-
national law. Courts and other authorities must more closely scrutinize in-
ternational law scholarship as they do the scholarship in other fields to, as
mentioned by Professor Stephens earlier, distinguish the good from the
bad. 39 The high standards applied to determine what scholarship counts as
informative to those charged with identifying international law must be de-
liberately and strictly applied with caution.
There has been tremendous growth in international law scholarship
seen in the numbers reported in this essay. It has been an interesting, ex-
panding, and important journey for international law scholars and the devel-
opment of international law. There is no doubt that international law
scholarship's relevance and influence will continue and evolve in the next
50 years too as the globalization international law becomes more and more
evident and pervasive.
39. Stephens, supra note 28, at 318.
[Vol. 22
International Law Scholarship
m0 W. W)C1
0
V -'0j 1" ' 0 t -,t -,r o' r- a, -i- N- 0' r-' NCD 00 C'
*0al 00 7 W ) ) _- 00 '0 ' 0' n) 00 00 NO S2' ' 0C
C
.0
2~' 0 LO '000
< 
10 00
0C-
00
. 2 v)v - nq - 0 't C
.4) v m ' ' 'n N- 't' 't ~ ' 'm W') C~'m W' C't M (nS 00 '0 "C '0 '0
>< 10
~CE
'0a 0 '1 .00 N1 N1 N0 N- N0 N, C- N; N4 Nd In0 00000{ ' ~0 10 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0 '0
2015-2016]
BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW
E
2~A~ NCOr0 0r~ n - -~~-~
00 NN NN N
t In 2c 00 '' L, - en M C 0O 0 M '0 - 0% 0 N C'4 Nrn'(q .< C14-- N N N q m m~ m' m m 't -It ' t It Nt t
U
b o
f~n ~ N 0 )' l 11 m~ 'C C) ND 't - 0 w m ND m m 0 -~ 0
m
*0 E
cn 't -It \0 v) m ~-N N- Nt Ct) N CC* ct) Ct) Ct) m Ct) CD I t C C 1 t(
Ct) 'CO k1) w) Ct) c, 0 0 0 c Ct) 0o 0 Ct) 'Cc
--
cp
a) Ct: rt . 1 c Cm m ,O a\ C, qt It 'c N r- 'oo C> cq L N c
oo - - r 4 C r4 N4 N N N Mt Mt t t Ct) ' t
E
Oo ( 1 C Cc C a , 0 ( ) 0'
--- N N" N N N- N4 " N
c, M 221 , )
[Vol. 22
